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Abstract 
 
The courts, the SEC, and the U.S. Congress should take up the recent opportunity 
presented by the Second Circuit decision in United States v. Newman (773 F.3d 438 (2014)) to 
define what material, nonpublic insider trading information means and in this spirit, we offer a 
new approach. Our approach is simple, easy to implement and difficult to circumvent by 
insiders.   
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2 
 The statutory penalties for illegal insider trading are almost as severe as first-degree 
murder, yet we see insiders make tens of thousands of lucrative transactions every year.  
Moreover, the increase in penalties over time has done little to slow down insider trading.
 1
  
What is the explanation for this paradox?   
Even though more than 80 years have passed since the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, which prohibits fraud in the purchase or sale of any security and more than 50 years have 
passed since the 1961 decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.
2
 holding trading by insiders on 
material, nonpublic information illegal, neither the U.S. Congress nor the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has defined what the phrase material, nonpublic information 
means.  In the absence of any definition, courts typically find insider trades made immediately 
prior to disclosure of corporate takeovers, earnings announcements, and dividend announcements 
as unlawful.
3
  Immediately usually means within days or hours of an announcement by the firm.  
What is much less clear is whether trading on a takeover or earnings information one month 
before the announcement is legal.  What is also not clear is the legality of trading on other types 
of valuable information such as corporate structuring, new security issues, corporate borrowing 
decisions, and personnel changes, etc., all of which can significantly impact stock prices.
4
   We 
argue that it is this ambiguity about what is and is not allowed under the law that enables 
corporate insiders to engage in profitable transactions. 
                                                 
1
 See Mirela V. Hristova, The Case for Insider-Trading Criminalization and Sentencing Reform, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 
267, 279-80 (2012). See generally Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed 
Options Trading Prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading?, Working Paper (2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2441606. 
2
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
3
 Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 1680 (1992) (noting that 
insider trading is associated with immediate price movements and quick price discovery”). 
4
 See e.g., Karl-Adam Bonnier and Robert F. Bruner, An Analysis of Stock Price Reaction to Management Change in 
Distressed Firms, J. OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS, 95 (1989);  Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Corporate 
Disclosure, a Murky Definition of Material, N.Y. TIMES, APRIL 5, 2011.  
3 
Over the past 30 years, as public concern about illegal insider trading has increased, 
Congress has responded by passing legislation that has repeatedly increased the penalties upon 
conviction.  In 1984, Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA),
5
 followed by 
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA)
6
 in 1988 and followed by 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX)
7
 in 2002, all without defining what constitutes illegal insider 
information.  Currently, the penalties from insider trading can reach up to 20 years in prison and 
up to one million dollars in penalties for each offense.
8
   
Yet, while the penalties have increased over time, the definition of illegal insider 
information has become even more ambiguous.  To further complicate this matter, through a 
strict interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks v. S.E.C,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit recently required a showing of personal benefit to insider-tippers before 
attaching liability to tippees.
10
 In particular, in order to establish tippee liability, the Second 
Circuit now requires the government “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tippee knew that 
an insider disclosed confidential information and that he did so in exchange for a personal 
benefit.”11  This ruling significantly raises the bar for establishing liability because this 
requirement can easily be avoided by traders who add additional layers between the original 
tipper and the eventual tippee.  Moreover, the U.S. Solicitor General has requested that the 
Supreme Court review the decision; and, if certiorari is granted, the Court may apply the Second 
                                                 
5
 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264. 
6
 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 704, 102 Stat. 4677. 
7
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
8
 Hristova supra, note 1, at 279-80. 
9
 See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (holding that derivative (tippee) liability can only be found where 
the insider-tipper “personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, 
there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”). 
In Dirks, the insider-tipper shared personal information with an analyst (the defendant) in order to expose an 
insurance scam being perpetrated by the tipper’s company. Id. 
10
 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014). 
11
 Newman, 773 F.3d at 442. 
4 
Circuit’s personal benefit requirement nationwide.12 We argue that the additional ambiguity 
created by the Newman ruling will lead to fewer insider trading prosecutions, increased 
frequency and profitability of insider trading, thereby causing detriment to the investing public 
and its confidence in public markets.
13
 
Therefore, the courts, the SEC and Congress should reverse course and define insider 
trading more precisely.  Increasing civil and criminal penalties does not work as a successful 
deterrent if there is substantial ambiguity about what is illegal insider trading.  This ambiguity 
allows insiders to not only trade successfully but also to fend off attempts by the SEC and the 
U.S. Justice Department to discipline them after the fact.  The evidence we present in this paper 
is consistent with our hypothesis.  Our evidence shows that insiders have been able to engage in 
hundreds of thousands of lucrative transactions over the past 40 years without ever worrying 
about sanctions.   
 We thus urge the courts, the SEC, and Congress to take this opportunity to define the 
phrase “material, nonpublic” and in this spirit, we offer an evidentiary presumption. Our 
presumption is simple, easy to implement, and difficult to circumvent by insiders. We propose 
that the a prima facie case of trading on material, nonpublic information be found upon proof 
that: (1) the information giving rise to the trade is of the type that requires an 8-K filing by the 
corporation, (2) its announcement must lead to statistically significant abnormal stock returns, 
and (3) the insider trading must have occurred within two months prior to the announcement of 
the information.  Given that corporations file 10-Q and 10-K reports every three months, these 
                                                 
12
 U.S. Asks Justices to Review ‘Newman’ Insider Case, SECURITIES LAW DAILY, Aug. 3, 2015, 
http://www.bna.com/us-asks-justices-n17179934226/; see also http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Newman-petition-by-SG-7-29-15.pdf. 
13
 Beeson, Ed, SEC Loses Insider Trading case on Home Court”, Law360, September 14, 2015.  See, 
http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/702227?nl_pk=b7cedb18-41f7-4adf-baa2-
177ef5398f80&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=securities 
5 
conditions in effect require that all insider trading based on 10-Q/K information to be confined to 
approximately one-month window after each earnings announcement.
14
  If all three conditions 
are satisfied, then the burden of proof must shift to the insiders to show that the particular 
transaction does not meet the material, nonpublic information requirement.  Furthermore, any 
tipping by insiders of any information satisfying these three conditions above must again shift 
the burden of proof to defendants to show that their tip(s) should be exempted. 
There is evidence that information disclosed in 8-K filings provides new and material 
information to the public. Recent research shows that 15,419 transactions executed by insiders 
during the four-business-days prior to the filing of 8-K reports exhibit statistically significant 
abnormal trading profits of 42 basis points.
15
  This finding indicates that insiders can and do 
exploit the new information contained in 8-K reports. 
Of course, this evidentiary presumption does not cover all possible instances of insider 
trading and it is not intended to be comprehensive.  For instance, insiders may trade on material, 
nonpublic information and yet, they may still end up losing money due to unexpected 
circumstances.  Insiders may also exploit long-lived information beyond two months.  Our 
objective is to provide a prima-facie presumption of what is always considered material, 
nonpublic information, similar to Rule 14e-3 (described below), which has declared takeover-
related information to be always material and nonpublic.  We recognize that other types of 
trading may still fall in a grey area and will need to be resolved through a fact-finding process. 
We expect additional clarity will allow all insiders who want to be on the safe side of the 
law to ensure that their transactions do not meet any of the conditions set forth above.  Insiders 
                                                 
14
 Typically, one week after earnings announcements is also considered a black-out period to allow to markets to 
fully digest the earnings information.  This in effect confines insider trading to one and four weeks between each 
earnings announcement. 
15
 See Alma Cohen, Robert Jackson & Joshua Mills, “The 8-K Trading Gap,” Columbia University working paper.  
available at http://bj1.law.columbia.edu/8kgap. 
6 
already know which events trigger an 8-K filing.  By not trading or tipping during the two-month 
window preceding an upcoming 8-K filing, insiders can easily ensure that at least two of the 
three conditions will not be satisfied.  The benefit of this additional clarity should enable courts 
to separate routine insider trading from opportunistic trading and increase the confidence in the 
public equity markets.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I discusses the development 
of insider trading law and recent developments in materiality of insider trading information, 
including the role of the Newman decision. Section II outlines the numerous criminal and civil 
penalties imposed upon the undefined offense of insider trading. Section III describes our 
proposal for a new evidentiary presumption and discusses the potential effects of the Newman 
decision in establishing liability under insider trading laws.  In Section IV, we argue that insiders 
exploit the vagueness in the statutes to engage in profitable transactions.  Thus, the profitability 
of insiders’ transactions is itself a measure of the (in) effectiveness of the insider trading laws.  
We also present evidence on time series profitability of historical insider trading to gauge the 
deterrence effect of the insider trading laws.    Our conclusions follow.    
I. The Development of Insider Trading Law   
Insider trading is not defined in federal securities laws, thus the courts are left to interpret 
whether insider trading is fraudulent and, more specifically to define material, nonpublic insider 
information.
16
 The lack of statutory or regulatory definition in this respect is troublesome and out 
of line with many jurisdictions across the Atlantic.
17
 In the U.S., the offense is based on 
                                                 
16
 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. 
17
 Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty‐Free Insider Trading?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 424 (2013).  In 
the European Union (EU) for example, the offense is defined in a statutory directive, the Market Abuse Directive. 
The Directive is detailed and the crime is premised on the concept of parity of information without a requirement of 
deception or misleading conduct, or breach of a fiduciary duty or any similar relationship of trust and/or confidence.  
Id. at 369.  The SEC lobbied for a similar parity-of-information approach, but this approach was rejected in 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), where the Supreme Court found it too broad in scope, since Rule 
7 
interpretations, both judicial and administrative, of the antifraud provisions in Section 10(b) of 
the Securities and Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 of the SEC.
18
  While state causes of action and 
liability for securities fraud had existed long before,
19
 serious federal involvement did not begin 
until 1961, when the SEC argued in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
20
 that federal antifraud 
provisions should extend to cover insider trading.
21
 The crime is either criminal or civil and has 
been interpreted by the courts as requiring intent.
22
  
Today, according to the SEC, insider trading “generally occurs when a security is bought or 
sold in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence while in 
possession of material, nonpublic information.”23 “Inside information” is generally understood to 
be “nonpublic information about events or circumstances related to a company’s assets or 
earning power known only to corporate management and its confidants, and which can 
reasonably be expected to have a material effect on the company’s share price.”24 Not all insider 
trading cases involve this type of information, however. Some concern trading by professionals 
on nonpublic market information, and others include “tipping” this information to others. The 
SEC defines information as being material “if its release could affect the company’s stock price.” 
The SEC definitions and rules are generally broader than the limited rulings of the courts. 
A.  Lack of Statutory Clarity 
                                                                                                                                                             
10b-5 is based on fraud. The parity-of-information approach is focused on the information, not how the person 
obtains it from his or her source, and does not involve criminal intent. The U.S. has not adopted this approach and 
continues to suffer from lack of clear definitions of insider trading. 
18
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. 
19
 Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive Compensation, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
291, 293 (1999). 
20
 Id. 
21
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8-3925, 40 S.E.C. 907 (Nov. 8, 1961); see Thompson, supra note 
17, at 293. 
22
 See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222. 
23
 SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml.  
24
 Roberta S. Karmel, The Law on Insider Trading Lacks Needed Definition, Brooklyn Law School Legal Studies, 
Research Paper No. 413, at 2 (May 2015),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607693 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
8 
 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”) provides:   
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange— 
. . .  
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based 
swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
25
 
 
SEC Rule 10(b)(5) similarly states: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.
26
 
 
It is notable that neither the statute nor the regulatory rule even utilize the phrase “insider 
trading” let alone define it.  Instead, insider trading has been considered fraud, covered by the 
above statute and rule, through court interpretation.
27
 
Historically, the SEC and the U.S. government did not agree on the definition of insider 
trading. The SEC resisted defining insider trading in fear that a definition would enable more 
fraud.
28
 Therefore, it has passed rules to clarify the borders of what the crime constitutes based 
                                                 
25
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
26
 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. 
27
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8-3925, 40 S.E.C. 907 (Nov. 8, 1961) (the first decision to hold that 
section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act and SEC rule 10(b)(5) apply to insider trading); Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 
(the first Supreme Court case to hold that section 10(b) and rule 10(b)(5) cover insider trading).  
28
 See e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Keynote Address at the PLI Securities Regulation Institute: Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law 
Unto Itself? (noting that the S.E.C. “has repeatedly resisted any effort by Congress to statutorily define insider 
trading, preferring to leave the concept sufficiently flexible as to be able to adjust to new developments”) Nov. 5, 
9 
on the court decisions on the matter throughout the years. When the U.S. Senate
29
 and the U.S. 
House of Representatives
30
 attempted to define insider trading with proposed bills in 1987, the 
SEC proposed its own bill.
31
 These bills, however, adopted different approaches. Whereas the 
Senate and SEC gave contemporaneous traders the ability to recover damages, the House put 
forward a criminal statute.
32
  
The Senate bill would have considered “information … [to have been] used or obtained 
wrongfully only if it has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, 
theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual, employment, 
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence.”33 The SEC, on the other hand, wanted to 
outlaw trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information only if this information 
“has been obtained by, or its communication would constitute, directly or indirectly (A) theft, 
bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through electronic or other means) or (B) conversion, 
misappropriation, or any other breach of any personal or other relationship of trust and 
confidence, or breach of any contractual or employment relationship.” 34  This change from 
“possession” to “use” resulted in no action being taken until the ITSFEA 35  which, while 
increasing sanctions for the crime, was not any more helpful in defining insider trading.
36
  
B.  Defining Insider Trading through Case Law  
                                                                                                                                                             
2014; The Muddle of Insider Trading Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/24/business/l-the-muddle-of-insider-trading-regulation-101791.html. 
29
 S. 1380, 100
th
 Cong. (1987). 
30
 H.R. 1238, 100
th
 Cong. (1987). 
31
 Insider Trading Act of 1987, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1284 (1987). 
32
 S. 1380, 100
th
 Cong. (1987); H.R. 1238, 100
th
 Cong. (1987); Insider Trading Act of 1987, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1284 (1987). 
33
 S. 1380, at 2. 
34
 Accompanying Letter, and Analysis by Ad hoc Legislation Committee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 
(1987).  
35
 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) 
(codified in subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 & 80b-4a).  
36
 Karmel, supra note 22, at 9.  
10 
In large part due to the lack of statutory clarity, the courts find it necessary to shape the 
boundaries of what constitutes illegal insider information through case law.  In re Cady, Roberts 
& Co,
37
 the first insider trading case under Rule 10b-5, a broker-dealer’s liability derived from 
the conduct of one of its principals, a director of a corporation that decided to make a dividend 
cut.
38
 The SEC found the director had violated Rule 10b-5 when, soon after leaving the board 
meeting, he sold securities in customer accounts of the broker-dealer, including those in which 
he had a beneficial interest.
39
 The SEC emphasized the existence of a relationship, which gave 
the director access to inside information only intended for a corporate purpose and the unfairness 
of allowing him to take advantage of this information by trading without disclosure.
40
 
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
41
 the Second Circuit adopted this view when it 
affirmed an injunction against an issuer, its officers and employees, disallowing them from 
trading and tipping others to trade stocks and options based on insider information concerning a 
large copper strike by the issuer in Canada. The court rooted its decision in the theory that 
investors trading on impersonal exchanges should have similar access to material information.
42
 
In this case and those following, the SEC would argue that in the public securities markets Rule 
10b-5 requires a parity of information among traders.
43
  
In In re Investors Management Co., investment advisers and mutual fund managers sold 
stock in a company because of a selective disclosure from the underwriter of the company’s 
debentures of a reduction in its earnings.
44
 The SEC held that anyone who obtains insider 
information, “which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate source and which places 
                                                 
37
 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
38
 Id. at 909. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. at 911-13. 
41
 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
42
 Id. at 849. 
43
 Karmel, supra note 22, at 3.  
44
 In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 636-37 (1971). 
11 
him in a position superior to other investors, acquires a relationship with respect to that 
information giving rise to a legal duty under Rule 10b-5.”45 Commissioner Smith’s concurring 
opinion further stated that the tippee “must know that the information was given to him in breach 
of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer” and the information must also 
have substantially contributed to the trading at hand.
46
 The case exemplifies the two main 
questions in the debate:  first, whether possession of insider information is enough for a violation 
or if it also has to be traded or used and, second, must the tippee trading on the information know 
that it was given in breach of a duty by someone with a special relationship with the company in 
question in which he or she cannot disclose this information?
47
 This concurring opinion would 
resonate in a later ruling of the Court.  
Almost a decade later in Chiarella v. United States,
48
 the Supreme Court rejected this 
parity of information theory stating that not every case of financial unfairness is in violation of 
Rule 10b-5.
49
 In this case, the Court reversed the conviction of an employee of a printing 
company who, upon learning of upcoming tender offers for a few target companies, purchased 
shares in those companies in order to sell them at a profit after the tender offer was announced.
50
 
Because the names of the companies were not well disguised, the employee was able to ascertain 
their names on his own and, thus, was not tipped. Noting this, the Court held that “silence in 
connection with a purchase or sale constitutes fraud only if liability is premised on a duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence.”51 
                                                 
45
 Karmel, supra note 22, at 3 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240). 
46
 Id. 
47
 Karmel, supra note 22, at 3. 
48
 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
49
 Id. at 231-32. 
50
 Id. at 222. 
51
 Id. at 230. 
12 
Apart from its majority opinion, the case also generated an important dissent from Chief 
Justice Burger, which shaped the development of insider trading law. In his dissent, he stated that 
a rule, that does not require parties to an arm’s length business transaction to disclose, in the 
absence of a confidential or fiduciary relation,  
permits a businessman to capitalize on his experience and skill in securing and 
evaluating relevant information; it provides incentive for hard work, careful 
analysis, and astute forecasting. But the policies that underlie the rule also should 
limit its scope. In particular, the rule should give way when an informational 
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by 
some unlawful means.
52
  
 
In the 5-4 decision, the majority of the Justices presumably supported the misappropriation 
doctrine.
53
 
Sidestepping this limited understanding of insider trading violations, the SEC passed 
Rule 14e-3.
54
 Rule 14-e-3 creates a “disclose or abstain” from trading requirement for anyone 
who (1)  possesses material information concerning a tender offer and (2) knows or has reason to 
know the information is nonpublic and derived from the offeror or target company. The SEC 
regards this as a prophylactic rule and argues that neither scienter nor breach-of-duty is required 
to trigger a violation.
55
 This rule proved to be useful in its prosecutions involving advance 
knowledge of tender offers, and both the SEC and the DOJ prosecuted a number of cases under 
this rule, on the basis of misappropriation theory.
56
  
                                                 
52
 Id. at 239-40. 
53
 Karmel, supra note 22, at 4 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222). 
54
 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3 (2014).  
55
 Karmel, supra note 22, at 4 n. 33 (citing Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 17120, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 
(Sept. 4, 1980)). 
56
 Karmel, supra note 22, at 4; see SEC v. Jacobs, No. 13-CV-1289 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2013) (denying defendants’ 
motion for judgment as a matter of law where downstream tippees allegedly traded on information concerning a 
planned tender offer); Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., Nos. 13-cv-1327, 13- cv-1892 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 2014) (reversing the 
trial court’s dismissal of insider trading charges where defendants allegedly traded on information concerning a 
planned tender offer).  
13 
Explicitly rejecting the equal access or parity of information theory, the Supreme Court in 
Dirks v. SEC, overturned the SEC’s sanctions against Dirks finding that a tippee’s liability is 
derivative.
57
  Dirks, an insurance company analyst, received information from a former officer of 
a company and began an independent investigation resulting in a finding that the company was 
engaging in large scale fraud.
58
 After Dirks told his clients and potential clients about his 
findings, many sold their shares of the company. The Court rejected SEC’s argument that when 
tippees come into knowledge of material information they know is confidential, they must 
publicly disclose it or abstain from trading.
59
 Instead, in order for a tippee to be held liable for 
trading on material, nonpublic information, the tipper must have breached her duty “before the 
tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain.”60 As the Dirks Court explained, because there are 
many legitimate reasons why an insider might disclose material nonpublic information,
61
 the test 
for insider breach “is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure.”62 According to Dirks, personal benefit may be satisfied in many ways, e.g., by proof 
of pecuniary benefits, reputational benefits that will promote future earnings, the benefit 
associated with "mak[ing] a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend," or 
even the mere existence of a relationship between the insider and tippee that suggests a quid pro 
quo arrangement;
63
 and the federal courts have typically imposed little burden on prosecutors in 
                                                 
57
 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 647. 
58
 Id. at 646. 
59
 Id. at 647. 
60
 Id.  
61
 In Dirks, for example, the insider-tipper was acting as a whistleblower and disclosed information to the defendant 
in order to expose an insurance scam occurring at his company. 
62
 Id. at 662. 
63
 Id. 
14 
proving this element.
64
 Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.
65
  
Hence, a tippee is not liable unless the use of the information breaches a fiduciary duty 
that she owed to either her clients or organization and the insider realized a personal benefit. The 
ruling thus endorsed Commissioner Smith’s aforementioned opinion in Investors Management.66 
Following the ruling, the SEC attempted to distinguish the case of SEC v. Stevens
67
  from 
Dirks. In Stevens, a CEO made a number of unsolicited calls to some securities analysts to tell 
them the soon-to-be announced quarterly results would be lower than expected.
68
 The SEC 
argued that through his selective disclosure the CEO attempted to benefit from enhancing his 
reputation and managerial status.
69
 Following a settlement in the case, the SEC adopted 
Regulation FD, which imposed a duty on public companies that disclose insider information to 
analysts or others in the industry to simultaneously disclose it publicly.
70
 
The courts and the SEC also do not agree on the interpretation of situations involving the 
tipping of family members by insiders. For example, in United States v. Chestman,
71
 a husband 
tipped a stockbroker based on information he had received from his wife, who had received it 
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through a line of family members, starting with a family member who was a corporate insider.
72
 
The stockbroker was prosecuted in the matter, but the Second Circuit overturned the conviction 
under Section 10(b),
73
 arguing that a family relationship is not a sufficient basis to establish the 
fiduciary relationship necessary based on Chiarella
74
 and Dirks.
75
 Following this holding, the 
SEC passed Rule 10b5-2, which establishes that “(3) whenever a person receives or obtains 
material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child or sibling: provided 
however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of 
trust or confidence existed with respect to the information” he or she has a duty of trust and 
confidence under the misappropriation theory.
76
 
The causal connection between a trader’s possession of insider information and her 
trading is unclear in the case law, and the circuits currently disagree on its proper interpretation.  
For example, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Teicher that “knowing possession” is 
sufficient to establish insider trading liability.
77
 Yet, in SEC v. Adler, the Eleventh Circuit found 
that “use” is required.78 In United States v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit required a proof of “use” in a 
criminal case, since criminal intent cannot be based on a legal presumption.
79
 The SEC again 
answered the question by passing Rule 10b5-1, which establishes that trading “on the basis” of 
insider information means the trader “was aware of” the information when the trade was made.80 
The next Supreme Court case to deal with insider trading was United States v. O’Hagan, 
in which the Court reinstated a criminal conviction under Rule 10b-5 and 14e-3 of a lawyer who 
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traded in the securities of a target company when the bidder was a client of the defendant’s law 
firm.
81
 The holding further advanced the Court’s agreement with the misappropriation theory and 
found that SEC can regulate non-deceptive activities “as a reasonably designed means of 
preventing manipulative acts” under § 14(e).82  
Following many victories for the SEC and the DOJ, both have prosecuted insider trading 
robustly. The SEC alone has prosecuted almost 600 defendants in civil insider trading cases over 
the past five years.
83
  
C.  The Ambiguity of Defining “Material, Nonpublic” in the Case Law 
  There is no clear answer to what constitutes “material, nonpublic information” in the case 
law. In general, “material” information is information that fits into one or more of the following 
categories: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the 
information as important in making his or her investment decisions,
84
 (2) the disclosure of such 
information would be “viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available,” 85  or (3) the disclosure of that information is 
“reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security.”86  
The SEC defines information as “nonpublic” when investors “may not lawfully acquire 
[it] without the consent of the source,” or when the information may be lawfully disseminated 
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but has not been made available to investors generally.
 87
 According to the SEC, insiders must 
wait a “reasonable” amount of time after disclosure before trading. What constitutes a 
“reasonable” amount of time depends on the circumstances of the disclosure.88  
The courts, in contrast, have focused more on the “material” portion of the test. The basic 
test for materiality was established in List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
89
 in which the court held that the 
materiality of the information rests on “whether a reasonable man would attach importance [to 
the information] in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.” This includes 
any information that “in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the 
corporation’s stock or securities.”90 Material information also encompasses “those facts which 
affect the probable future of the company and those which may affect the desire of investors to 
buy, sell, or hold the company’s securities.”91 
The determination of materiality is fact-specific; hence, depending on the circumstances, 
the same information may be material or non-material.
92
 In practice, certain factors seem to 
easily satisfy the materiality test. For example, the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) guidelines 
generally include the following information as material: dividend increase, decrease, or 
omission; quarterly earnings of sales considerably different from consensus; gain or loss of a 
major client; changes in management; important development within the industry; government 
reports of economic trends; large acquisition or divestiture; and when an offer is made to tender 
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shares.
93
 Courts often cite the market price impact of the information and the source of the 
information in support of a finding of materiality. A court is more likely to find the information 
material when the source of the information is reliable.
94
  
On numerous occasions, the courts have found that confidential information about tender 
offers can be material, nonpublic information. In Chestman, the Second Circuit Court stated 
“[o]ne violates Rule 14e-3(a) if he trades on the basis of material nonpublic information 
concerning a pending tender offer that he knows or has reason to know has been acquired 
‘directly or indirectly’ from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or someone working on their 
behalf.” 95   As discussed previously, in this case a husband tipped a stockbroker based on 
information that his wife received from her family members.
96
 The court did not dispute that the 
husband’s statement to the broker that the corporation would be sold at a “substantially higher” 
price than its market value was material, nonpublic information.
97
 
In SEC v. Maio,
98
 the Seventh Circuit found that an executive in the process of an 
acquisition was in possession of material, nonpublic information when he allegedly disclosed 
this information in a series of phone calls to his friend. The friend discussed this information 
with a third individual, who then bought and sold various securities prior to the acquisition being 
made public.
99
 The Court held that Rule 14e-3 establishes a “duty to disclose material nonpublic 
information or abstain from trading in stocks implicated by an impending tender offer.”100 
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In O’Hagan, discussed above, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer who had knowledge 
of a tender offer through his connection to the legal counsel of the corporation was in possession 
of material, nonpublic information.
101
 James O’Hagan was a partner in a law firm that was 
retained as local counsel to represent Grant Metropolitan PLC (Grant Met) in a potential tender 
offer for the common stock of the Pillsbury Company. O’Hagan did not do any work on the 
representation of the company and the firm withdrew from representing the company less than a 
month before the tender offer became public.  
While the firm was still representing Grand Met, O’Hagan began to purchase call options 
of Pillsbury stock giving him rights to purchase additional shares. By the time the tender offer 
became public, he had owned 2,500 unexpired options, more than any other individual 
investor.
102
 When the tender offer became public and the stock prices shot up, O’Hagan sold his 
call options and common stock, with a profit of more than $4.3 million.
103
  
The SEC began an investigation into these transactions alleging that O’Hagan defrauded 
his law firm and its client, Grand Met, when using material, nonpublic information about the 
planned tender offer for personal trading purposes.
104
 A jury convicted O’Hagan on all 57 
counts, but a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed these convictions.
105
 
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and held that under Rule 
14e-3(a) trading based on material, nonpublic information “that concerns a tender offer and that 
the person knows or should know has been acquired from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or 
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someone working on their behalf, unless within a reasonable time before any purchase or sale 
such information and its source are publicly disclosed” is unlawful. 106 
In Chiarella,
107
also previously discussed, the Supreme Court held that an employee of 
financial printer that printed takeover bids was in possession of material, nonpublic information 
when he deduced the names of the target companies (based on the information contained in 
documents delivered to the printer) and purchased stock in the target companies. In this case, 
however, the individual did not have a duty to disclose because he had no fiduciary duties to or 
specific relationships with the shareholders in the corporation.
108
 
Knowledge of confidential facts that could have a significant impact on the price of the 
company’s stock can also constitute material, nonpublic information. In Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co.,
109
 the defendants had knowledge of confidential information regarding the results of TGS 
drilling in Timmins, Ontario when such information was not publicly available, and a few 
defendants disclosed this information to others for use.
110
 The court disagreed with the trial judge 
and found that the knowledge of the discovery hole would have been important to a reasonable 
investor and could have affected the price of stock; therefore, it was material information. 
Furthermore, the Court stated that an important factor in determining whether this information 
was material was “the importance attached to the drilling results by those who knew about it.”111 
 Similarly, in SEC v. Adler, the Eleventh Circuit held that an executive and board member 
of a company was in possession of material, nonpublic information when he was told at a board 
meeting that the company would be receiving fewer orders from one of its largest customers.
112
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In addition, the Second Circuit held in Teicher
113
 that the defendant, a principal of a securities 
firm, possessed material, nonpublic information when he received the names of the companies 
on the Drexel “phantom list.” The list contained the names of companies Drexel would not be 
able to trade in because the firm was working on transactions involving these companies.
114
  
The information can be ‘soft’ and still be found material. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that “‘soft,’ forward-looking information may be material in the meaning of Rule 
10b-5” in United States v. Smith.115 In this case, the court held that “forecasts of future sales and 
revenue” may be understood as “soft” information, but can still be material under specific 
circumstances.
116
  
Information about fraudulent corporate practices can also be material information. In 
Dirks,
117
 the officer of the New York broker-dealer firm that received information from a former 
officer of a corporation that the corporation had overstated its assets due to fraudulent corporate 
practices.
118
 He urged Dirks to verify the alleged fraud and to disclose it publicly. Dirks began an 
investigation and discussed his findings with investors and clients, which resulted in a number of 
large investment advisers to liquidating their holdings of more than $16 million in the company’s 
stock. As a result, the corporation’s stock fell dramatically. The Court found that the information 
of fraud shared by Dirks was material, nonpublic information.
119
 
D.  Tippee Derivative Liability, “Personal Benefit” and Newman 
 As discussed above, the Court in Dirks rejected the view (of the SEC) that a tippee has a 
duty to abstain from trading simply because he has received material, nonpublic information 
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from an insider.
120
 Moreover, because the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
require scienter,
121
 in order for tippee liability to exist, a tippee must also know or have reason to 
know that the tipper has disclosed in breach of a duty of confidence.
122
 Negligent disclosure of 
information, however, is not sufficient.
 123
 Whether recklessness is sufficient remains open to 
debate; the circuits are split on this question and the Supreme Court has yet to address it.124 
 The federal courts also remain divided as to whether (and the extent to which) a tippee-
violator must be aware of a personal benefit received by the tipper. As noted above, some courts 
are content to infer that a tippee was complicit in the tipper’s breach simply on the basis of a 
preexisting relationship between the two. Others, however, like the Second Circuit in Newman, 
appear to require much more.
125
   
 In December of 2012, Newman and Chiasson were found guilty of committing securities 
fraud in violation of sections 10(b) and 32 of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rules 10b-5 
and 10b5-2, as well as of conspiring to commit securities fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
126
 Todd 
Newman and Anthony Chiasson who were convicted of insider trading in December 2012 for 
trading on material, nonpublic information received third and fourth hand from an insider at Dell 
and NVIDIA. Newman and Chiasson argued that neither knew the identity of the original source 
                                                 
120
 Id. at 646. 
121
 Liability for securities fraud requires proof of scienter, defined as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1991). 
122
 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646. 
123
 Id. 
124
  See Obus, 693 F.3d at 286 (“[w]hile the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether recklessness satisfies section 
10(b)'s scienter requirement . . . we have held that scienter "may be established through a showing of reckless 
disregard for the truth, that is, conduct which is highly unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure 
from the standards of ordinary care”). 
125
  See Newman 773 F.3d at 450 (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that “(1) the corporate insider was 
entrusted with a fiduciary duty; (2) the corporate insider breached his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing confidential 
information to a tippee (b) in exchange for a personal benefit; (3) the tippee knew of the tipper's breach, that is, he 
knew the information was confidential and divulged for personal benefit; and (4) the tippee still used that 
information to trade in a security or tip another individual for personal benefit”). 
126
 See Newman 773 F.3d at 442. 18 U.S.C. § 371 is the conspiracy statute. 
23 
of information, nor that this source violated a duty of confidentiality or received a personal 
benefit.
127
  
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Newman and Chiasson argued that the district court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must find that a tippee knew the insider had disclosed 
inside information in exchange for a personal benefit.
128
 Because there was no evidence that 
Newman or Chiasson possessed such knowledge, the defendants argued, the government had 
failed to establish tippee liability under Dirks.
129
 In response, the government claimed that Dirks 
only required that the “tippee know that the tipper disclosed information in breach of a duty,” not 
a requirement that the tippee also know that the insider received a personal benefit in exchange 
for information.
130
  
The government further contended that the defendants were “sophisticated traders,” and 
therefore, should have known that such information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a 
fiduciary duty and not for a legitimate business purpose.
131
 The district court agreed with this 
assessment and instructed the jury that the government had to only prove that the defendants 
“must have known that [the insider information] was originally disclosed by the insider in 
violation of a duty of confidentiality.”132 After being convicted by the jury on all counts, both 
defendants appealed the decision on the grounds that the government needed to prove that they 
had the knowledge of the personal benefit provided to the tippers under Dirks. They further 
claimed that there was insufficient evidence to prove the tippers received a personal benefit in 
exchange for the disclosed information.  
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In December, 2014, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that, under Dirks, it was 
necessary for the government to prove that the tippees knew the breach of duty was for a 
personal benefit. The court reached this conclusion as follows: a tippee’s liability is derivative;133 
therefore, a tippee cannot be held liable unless use of the information breaches a fiduciary duty 
owed by the tipper to his clients or organization and, the insider must have realized a personal 
benefit.
134
 The court further interpreted the language in Dirks as requiring the tippee to know 
about the personal benefit to be liable.
135
  As the court explained, “insider trading liability is 
based on breaches of fiduciary duty, not on informational asymmetries.” 136  Hence, the test 
established in Newman necessitates a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that:   
(1) the corporate insider was entrusted with a fiduciary duty; (2) the corporate 
insider breached his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing confidential information to a 
tippee; (b) in exchange for a personal benefit; (3) the tippee knew of the tipper’s 
breach, that is, he knew the information was confidential and divulged for 
personal benefit; and (4) the tippee still used that information to trade in a security 
or tip another individual for personal benefit.
137
 
The court also held that the benefit must be objective, consequential, and represent a potential 
gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature, hence, a mere friendship was insufficient to 
constitute personal benefit.
138
 
The 2014 decision vacated the convictions and ordered the district court to dismiss the 
indictment with prejudice because it found insufficient evidence to support a pecuniary benefit. 
The Court of Appeals found that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the 
government’s need to prove that the defendants were aware of a personal benefit and the 
government failed to establish that the defendants willfully engaged in insider trading. 
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 The Newman court found that a “tippee’s liability derives only from the tipper’s breach of 
a fiduciary duty, not from trading on material, nonpublic information”:139 “in both Chiarella and 
Dirks, the Supreme Court affirmatively established that insider trading liability is based on 
breaches of fiduciary duty, not on informational asymmetries.”140 The court further noted that the 
“Supreme Court rejected the SEC’s theory that a recipient of confidential information (i.e. the 
tippee) must refrain from trading whenever he received inside information from an insider.” 141 
 The Newman court pointed out that, according to Dirks, there can be no insider breach of 
fiduciary duty unless the insider receives a personal benefit “in exchange for disclosure.” 142 
Hence, the Second Circuit concluded that, even if a tipper has breached his or her fiduciary duty, 
a tippee is liable only if he or she knows or should have known of the personal benefit.
143
 
According to the court, tippee knowledge of a breach of the duty of confidentiality, without 
tippee knowledge of tipper personal benefit, is insufficient to impose criminal liability.
144
  
E.  The Limits of Newman  
  Newman leaves a large gap in its interpretation for potential inside traders to escape 
liability. The Newman decision reaffirmed the personal benefit requirement for insider trading 
convictions and illuminated the high evidentiary burden necessary for downstream tippees.
145
 
Prior to the holding in Newman, the government had worked to limit the Dirks benefit test. For 
example, it found the test to be satisfied when the tip was made in exchange for “maintaining a 
useful networking contact,”146 or when it simply entailed “making a gift of information to a 
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friend.”147 The Newman decision makes it more difficult for the government to win in cases 
where evidence of a pecuniary benefit is not easy to prove. Reputational benefits, for example, 
may not be sufficient to prove insider trading.  
In its tippee liability formula, the Newman decision diverges from common federal 
practice. Rather than allowing tippee knowledge of tipper breach of the duty of confidence to 
satisfy the tippee scienter requirement, the Second Circuit requires that the tippee also know of a 
personal benefit that will accrue to the tipper as a result of disclosure. Whether this distinction 
makes any practical difference, however, remains somewhat unclear. This is because the court 
must rely on the Dirks objective bases for proving tipper personal benefit in assaying tippee 
knowledge of personal benefit—most notably, evidence of a relationship implying a quid quo 
pro arrangement.  
1. The nature of tippee/tipper relations 
 The Newman court held that the government had presented insufficient evidence of 
“personal benefit,” in part, because insider tippers, Ray and Choi, “were not ‘close’ friends” and 
“were merely casual acquaintances” with the first level tippees, Sandy Goyal and Hyung Lim.148 
The court, for instance, found the evidence that Goyal advised Ray on a variety of career 
decisions and edited Ray’s resume insufficient to show the two had the kind of strong 
relationship that would have supported an inference of a quid pro quo arrangement.
149
 
Nevertheless, the court apparently entertained the idea that such a showing could be made with 
different evidence. Hence, personal benefit can still–and indeed should under Dirks—be inferred 
where a preexisting relationship between tippee and tipper is sufficiently strong. And there is no 
reason why the same evidence, which would support a jury inference beyond a reasonable doubt 
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would not also be sufficient to establish that a tippee knew or should have known the tipper 
disclosed information in order to gain a personal benefit.  
The court establishes that one must have knowledge of the personal benefit to the tipper 
and know that the trading is based on material, nonpublic information. Thereby, the ruling 
“raises the bar” for the remote-tippee prosecutions.150 Still, the holding does not clarify whether 
the showing of the remote tippee consciously avoiding learning of the personal benefit would 
meet the standard. Therefore, the Newman standard may lead to more illicit insider trading 
behavior aimed at escaping liability. 
2. Legitimate reasons for breach 
 Similarly, the Newman court also discusses how the investor relations departments at 
NVIDIA and Dell had a habit of disclosing material, nonpublic earnings data in advance of 
quarterly earnings.
151
 Because insiders at these companies engaged in this practice for the good 
of the company, the court found it unreasonable to infer that the circumstances under which 
Newman and Chiasson received their tips were enough to support an inference beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the original insider had disclosed in breach of her fiduciary duty.
152
 But in 
the absence of these special circumstances, such an inference might very well have been 
warranted. And, were this the case, the same evidence used to support a jury inference of tipper 
personal benefit may also support a jury inference that the tippee knew or should have known of 
the personal benefit.  
  3. What Newman changes  
 In Newman, the Second Circuit raises the bar significantly regarding the kind of 
relationship that will support an inference of a quid pro quo arrangement. In the Second Circuit, 
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the government will need to provide “proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that 
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of 
a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” 153  Examples that meet the new standard include 
tangible gifts, access to an investment club where stock tips and insight are routinely discussed, 
close working relationship on real estate deals in which parties commonly split commissions on 
transactions, and business referral relationships, such as dental work.
 154
 In many other federal 
courts, the kinds of relationships evidenced in Newman might well have sufficed.
155
  
  F. The Purpose of the Dirks Requirement  
 The Newman court’s rigid adherence to the personal benefit requirement as a necessary 
element of breach may overlook the reasons behind the requirement articulated in Dirks. As 
noted above, the Court in Dirks presented the personal benefit requirement as a test that would 
allow the judiciary to overcome a particular problem. Because there are legitimate (reasonable 
doubt-creating) reasons for insider disclosure of material, nonpublic information—e.g., 
stimulating the interest of potential new financers/stock purchasers or, as in Dirks, whistleblower 
tipping—the fact of disclosure alone is not enough to establish breach. For this reason, the Court 
introduced the personal benefit requirement as a proxy for assaying disclosure (il)legitimacy. 
Where a personal benefit exists, disclosure is presumptively illegitimate, and thus deceptive 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Where there is no personal benefit, the disclosure must have 
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been made (a) in the interest of the principal or (b) negligently—neither of which satisfies the 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement.156  
 This being the case, if the government can adduce compelling evidence that the insider-
tipper tipped knowingly (not accidentally) and that there is no reasonable explanation as to how 
tipping might promote the best interests of the principal, it seems unnecessary to insist upon 
evidence of a specific personal benefit. Rather, it would be logical under these circumstances to 
allow a jury to draw the inference that disclosure must have been made for personal benefit. This 
analysis would be particularly well-supported by Dirks, which allows similar inferences to be 
drawn on the basis of pre-tipping tipper/tippee relationships and which includes the benefit of 
making a gift of insider information to a trading friend or relative as a “personal benefit.” 157 If a 
tippee knows the insider is not tipping negligently, and she knows there is no reason to think the 
tipper’s disclosure will benefit the principal, then a jury should be permitted to draw the same 
inference about the tippee—i.e., that she knew or should have known that the tipper was 
disclosing information in exchange for a personal benefit (either to benefit herself or to benefit a 
friend or relative).
158
    
 For example, consider the case where a major stockholder tips investment analysts in 
order to spur favorable reports by the analysts, and to thus exert an upward influence on the price 
of his stock.
 159
 In this situation, if the tippee knows there is no reason to think that the disclosure 
is in the best interest of the principal, he knows what he is doing is wrong, just not precisely how 
it is wrong. This wrongdoer should not escape justice simply because of his perplexity as to how 
the insider expects to benefit from disclosure.  
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G.  Reform Proposals 
As a pushback against the 2014 Newman decision, there are now bills pending in 
Congress to define insider trading. The House proposal would amend Section 10 of the 
Securities Exchange Act to outlaw the purchasing or selling of “any security, or any securities-
based swap agreement, based on information that the person knows or, considering factors 
including financial sophistication, knowledge of and experience in financial matters, position in a 
company, and amount of assets under management, should know is material information or 
inside information.”160 The proposed legislation defines inside information as nonpublic, and 
obtained illegally, “directly or indirectly from an issue with an expectation of confidentiality or 
that such information will only be used for a legitimate business purpose or in violation of a 
fiduciary duty.”161 
On the other hand, the Senate bill would amend Section 10(b) to make it illegal to  
(A) …purchase, sell or cause the purchase or sale of any security on the basis of 
material information that the person knows or has reason to know is not publicly 
available, (B) To knowingly or recklessly communicate material information that 
the person knows or has reason to know is not publicly available to any other 
person under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such 
communication is likely to result in a violation of subparagraph (A).
162
 
  
The bill does not include “information that the person has independently developed from 
publicly available resources” under the “not publicly available” category.163 
III. The Paradox:  Penalties for the Undefined Insider Trading Offense 
As discussed above, neither the SEC nor Congress has yet defined the term “insider 
trading.”  Yet, Congress has established both civil and criminal penalties—including fines and 
prison terms—for engaging in this behavior.  The various penalties are described below. 
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A. Civil Penalties 
Prior to 1984, federal legislation did not impose civil penalties on insider trading. The 
SEC had to rely on federal court injunctions against future violations, as well as disgorgements 
of profits, to enforce securities fraud prohibitions.
164
 Although insider trading is not statutorily 
defined, in 1984, Congress enacted the ITSA
165
 to remedy the “inadequate deterrent provided by 
enforcement remedies for insider trading,” noting that neither injunctions nor disgorgement 
sufficiently penalized defendants for insider trading.
166
  The ITSA amended Section 21 of the 
Securities Exchange Act to include, in relevant part, that the SEC:  
may bring an action in a United States district court to seek, and the court shall 
have jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty . . . [the amount of which] shall be 
determined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances, but shall not 
exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful 
purchase or sale, and shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States.
167
  
 
Among the numerous changes implemented by ITSFEA,
168
 was expansion of the scope 
of civil penalties on insider trading to “controlling” persons—those “who, at the time of the 
violation, directly or indirectly controlled the person who committed such violation.”169 Civil 
penalties for a controlling person are limited to the greater of $1,000,000 or treble damages.
170
 If 
the “controlled person's violation was a violation by communication, the [damages] . . . [are] 
deemed to be limited to the profit gained or loss avoided by the person[s] to whom the controlled 
person directed such communication.”171 
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Empirical evidence provided by Professor Seyhun shows that neither ITSA nor ITSFEA 
was effective in reducing either the volume or profitability of insider trading.
172
  In fact, 
following these legislative changes, the volume of insider trading increased four-fold, while 
abnormal profitability of insider trading doubled.
173
  Insiders did not reduce their trading even on 
a temporary basis in response to these legislative initiatives.
174
  Seyhun concludes that among the 
possible reasons for the ineffectiveness of the increased sanctions are the highly stringent 
requirements for the legally material information.
175
 
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act also provide for civil penalties in other 
securities fraud contexts. Section 20(d)(1) of the Securities Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the 
Exchange Act permit the SEC to impose monetary penalties against persons who violate the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, respectively, “other than by committing a violation subject 
to a penalty pursuant to [section 21A of the Exchange Act].”176 Both Section 20(d)(1) of the 
Securities Act and 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act provide three-tier penalty systems, where the 
maximum penalty increases with the severity of the violation.
177
 The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently held that Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act is the only basis for ordering civil 
penalties in insider trading cases brought in federal court.
178
 The court, however, did not have 
cause to address the expanded scope of the Commission’s powers under the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”).179 
The Dodd-Frank Act significantly enhanced the SEC's enforcement powers by 1) 
granting the SEC the ability to obtain monetary penalties in administrative proceedings against 
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all individuals, not just those associated with regulated entities, and 2) increasing the civil 
penalties that the SEC can seek in administrative cases.
180
 Section 21B as amended states, in 
part: 
In any proceeding instituted pursuant to sections 15(b)(4), 15(b)(6), 15D, 15B, 
15C, 15E, or 17A of this title against any person, the [SEC] or the appropriate 
regulatory agency may impose a civil penalty if it finds . . . that such penalty is in 
the public interest and that such person—  
(A) has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, or this 
title, or the rules or regulations thereunder, or the rules of the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board; 
(B) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured 
such a violation by any other person; 
(C) has willfully made or caused to be made in any application for registration or 
report required to be filed with . . . any . . . appropriate regulatory agency under 
this title, or in any proceeding before the [SEC] with respect to registration, any 
statement which was, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under 
which it was made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or has 
omitted to state in any such application or report any material fact which is 
required to be stated therein; or (D) has failed reasonably to supervise, within the 
meaning of section 15(b)(4)(E) of this title, with a view to preventing violations 
of the provisions of such statutes, rules and regulations, another person who 
commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision.
181
 
 
Section 21(b) contains civil penalty provisions applicable in administrative proceedings similar 
to those in Section 21(d)(3) for judicial proceedings, except notably, 21B does not contain the 
“21(a)” exemption found in Section 21(d)(3).182 The three-tier penalty structure under Section 
21(b) also imposes the same maximum penalties as the penalty structure of Section 21(d)(3).
183
 
While the applicability of Section 21B to insider trading is still the subject of debate,
184
 the SEC 
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has continued using this section to impose civil penalties for insider trading in their 
administrative forum.
185
  
Additionally, Section 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act expanded the “anti-manipulation” 
authority of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") by amending Section 6 of 
the Commodity Exchange Act.
186
 The amended Section 6(c)(1) is closely modeled after Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and CFTC Regulation 180.1, promulgated in accordance 
with Section 6(c)(1), is the functional analog of Rule 10b-5.
187
 However, the CFTC has 
recognized that unlike securities markets, “derivatives markets have long operated in a way that 
allows for market participants to trade on the basis of lawfully-obtained, material nonpublic 
information,”188 and therefore has limited the scope of CFTC Regulation 180.1 with regard to 
insider trading. CFTC Regulation 180.1 only prohibits trading based on misappropriated 
information obtained or used in breach of a pre-existing duty.
189
 Furthermore, the Commission 
has noted that CFTC Regulation 180.1 does not create an affirmative duty of disclosure (except 
such disclosure that may be required “as necessary to make any statement made to the other 
person in or in connection with the transaction not misleading in any material respect”).190 The 
CFTC may assess in any case of manipulation or attempted manipulation a civil penalty of not 
more than $1 million or triple the monetary gain to the person for each violation.
191
 
B. Criminal Penalties 
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Most criminal prosecutions for violations of the federal securities laws, including the 
insider trading provisions, are brought under Section 24 of the Securities Act and Section 32(a) 
of the Exchange Act.
192
 Other bases for criminal liability in the insider trading context include 
the federal mail and wire fraud statutes,
193
 as well as the federal criminal offense of securities 
fraud (enacted as part of SOX).
194
 Section 24 of the Securities Act
195
 and Section 32(a) of the 
Exchange Act
196
 generally authorize criminal prosecutions for “willful violations” of provisions, 
rules, or regulations under the respective acts. In the insider trading context, the most common 
bases for criminal liability are violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, 
although Rule 14e-3 and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act are also frequently used.
197
 
Section 24 of the Exchange Act provides that “any person who willfully” (1) violates any 
of the provisions or related rules and regulations of the Act or (2) provides materially false or 
misleading information on a registration statement under the Act, is subject to a maximum fine 
of $10,000, a maximum prison term of five years, or both.
198
 Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act 
provides that any natural person who willfully violates any provision of the Act, other than 
Section 30,
199
 may be subject to a maximum penalty of $5,000,000, a maximum prison term of 
20 years, or both.
200
 A corporation may be subject to a fine not exceeding $25,000,000.
201
 
One of the primary contributions that SOX made to the insider trading statutory scheme 
was the new criminal securities fraud offense.
202
 Among other things, the provision makes it 
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unlawful to execute or attempt to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a person in connection 
with any security.
203
 The statute provides for a fine, a term of imprisonment of not more than 25 
years, or both.
204
  In 2009, the provision was amended by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 2009 to extend the criminal penalties to commodities fraud.
205
 
The DOJ has often relied on the federal mail and wire fraud statutes in criminal 
prosecutions by alleging Rule 10b-5 violations, including insider trading cases.
206
 The federal 
mail and wire fraud statutes prohibit the use of mail or wire, radio, or television communications 
“for the purpose of executing any scheme or artifice to defraud.” 207  Although these statutes may 
lack teeth in most securities fraud prosecutions, in insider trading cases, the wire and mail fraud 
statutes may enable prosecutors to reach conduct outside of the scope of Section 10(b).
208
 For 
example, under a wire or mail fraud theory, a crime is complete once a company is defrauded of 
its confidential information regardless of whether the information is used by anyone for purposes 
of trading. Also, the “materiality” required for wire and mail fraud may be easier to meet than 
that of securities fraud.
209
 Wire and mail fraud carry the same statutory penalties as a violation of 
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Section 10(b) (with a few exceptions – notably if “the violation affects a financial 
institution”).210 
Although federal judges have the right to impose any sentence for insider trading 
convictions, they are required to keep in mind the criminal sentencing guidelines. In the Dodd-
Frank Act, Congress issued directives to the U.S Sentencing Commission to "review and, if 
appropriate, amend" various sentencing guidelines and policy statements applicable to fraud 
offenses.
211
 The Sentencing Commission promulgated amendments to the federal sentencing 
guidelines for securities fraud, which took effect in 2012.
212
 
First, the Sentencing Commission adopted a new minimum offense level of 14 (which 
equates to a recommended prison range of 15-21 months for defendants with no criminal 
record)
213
 for any "organized scheme to engage in insider trading."
214
 The commentary lists 
factors that courts may consider in determining whether an insider trading scheme is 
"organized"—whether it involved "considered, calculated, systemic, or repeated efforts to . . . 
trade on insider information, as distinguished from . . . opportunistic instances of insider 
trading."
215
  For cases where there is minimal gain from insider trading, this will mean an 
automatic increase of six offense levels for all participants in the offense.
216
 As the profitability 
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of a scheme increases, however, the effect of this new provision diminishes, disappearing 
entirely when the overall gain from the scheme reaches $30,000.
217
  
The amendments to the insider trading guideline also broadened the applicability of the 
"abuse of trust" enhancement. Previously, defendants received increased punishment under the 
guidelines if their abuse of a position of public or private trust significantly facilitated the crime; 
this provision was not triggered unless the defendant's position was characterized by “substantial 
discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference.” 218  The amendment 
loosened that requirement, specifying that the enhancement applies if “the position of public or 
private trust . . . contributed in some significant way to facilitating the commission or 
concealment of the offense.”219 
The Sentencing Commission also added a special rule for determining loss in cases 
involving fraudulent inflation or deflation in the value of publicly traded securities or 
commodities.
220
 The amended commentary directs use of what has become known as the 
"modified rescissory method" for determining actual loss.
221
 The commentary also directs the 
court to presume that the modified rescissory method has accurately calculated the actual loss, 
but a party may rebut that presumption and persuade the court that it is not a "reasonable 
estimate of the actual loss."
222
 The court may consider, among other factors, the extent to which 
the amount so determined includes significant changes in value not resulting from the offense 
(e.g., changes caused by external market forces, such as changed economic circumstances, 
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changed investor expectations, and new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or 
events).
223
  
Finally, the Sentencing Commission expanded the provisions in the fraud guideline that 
govern when a judge may depart above or below the recommended guideline range.
224
 First, the 
Commission noted that an upward departure may be warranted if the offense created a risk of 
substantial loss beyond the loss determined under the guideline, “such as a risk of a significant 
disruption of a national financial market.”225 Second, the Commission provided new guidance on 
downward departures, adding the example of a securities fraud where fraudulent 
misrepresentations inflate the price of a stock in a manner that produces “an aggregate loss 
amount that is substantial but diffuse, with relatively small loss amounts suffered by a relatively 
large number of victims.”226 
 
III. Our Proposal:  A New Evidentiary Standard   
 
Many scholars
227
 agree that a clear statutory definition of illegal insider trading should be 
established, arguing that it is preferable to further judicial interpretation.
228
  Our proposal for 
reform follows below. 
 
 A. Requirements 
   We propose that the government be allowed to establish a prima facie case of illegal 
insider trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information when it can prove the following 
three elements: (1) the information giving rise to the trade is of the type that requires an 8-K 
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filing by the corporation; (2) its announcement must lead to statistically significant, abnormal 
stock returns; and (3) the putative insider trading must have occurred within two months prior to 
the announcement of the information.   
The first and third requirements are factual and can easily be satisfied.  The second 
requirement can be satisfied by following a similar procedure as we described in Section IV.  
Given that corporations file 10-Q and 10-K reports every three months, these conditions in effect 
require that all insider trading to be confined to approximately one-month window after each 
earnings announcement.
229
  If all three conditions are satisfied, then the burden of proof must be 
on insiders to show that their particular transaction does not meet the material, nonpublic 
information requirement.  Similarly, any trades made by individuals receiving tips from insiders 
(of any information satisfying the three conditions above) must also shift the burden of proof, in 
this case, to the tippee(s) accused of committing securities fraud. 
We expect additional clarity will allow all insiders who want to be on the safe side of the 
law to ensure that their transactions do not meet any of the conditions set forth above.  Insiders 
already know which events trigger an 8-K filing.  By not trading or tipping during the two-month 
window preceding an upcoming 8-K filing, insiders can easily ensure that at least two of the 
three conditions will not be satisfied.  The benefit of this additional clarity should enable courts 
to separate routine insider trading from opportunistic trading and increase the confidence in the 
public equity markets.  
 
 B. 8-K Filing Requirements   
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Form 8-K (“Form”) is a broad form used to notify investors of any material event that is 
important to shareholders or the SEC. The SEC usually considers an event to be material when 
“there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the information 
important to making an investment decision.”230 It is one of the most common forms filed with 
the SEC and supplements the public companies’ annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly 
reports on Form 10-Q. Public companies are required to file the Form under the Securities 
Exchange Act. These reports are available to the public on the SEC’s EDGAR website.231 
The Form is used for reports under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
and filed pursuant to Rule 13a-11 or Rule 15d-11, as well as for reports of nonpublic information 
required to be disclosed by Regulation FD (17 CFR 243.100 and 243.101).
232
 The Form may be 
used to satisfy the filing obligations under (1) Rule 425 of the Securities Exchange Act (17 CFR 
230.425) for written communications relating to business combination transactions; (2) Rule 
14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12) for soliciting materials and pre-
commencement communications for tender offers; (3) for pre-commencement communications 
under Rule 14d-2(b); and (4) for pre-commencement communication under Rule 13e-4(c) under 
the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b) and 240.13e-4(c)).
233
  
Triggering events apply to registrants and subsidiaries.
234
 The Form consists of nine 
sections.  Under Section 1,
235
 a company is required to file the Form when there is (1) an entry 
into a material definitive agreement; (2) termination of such agreement; (3) bankruptcy or 
receivership; as well as (4) reporting of shutdowns and patterns of violations in mine safety.  
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Item 1.01 requires a disclosure of material agreements not made in the ordinary course of 
business, or any material amendments to those. A material definitive agreement can be both 
written and oral.
236
 Taking out a loan with a bank or signing a long-term lease would require this 
disclosure, but signing a lease for an additional store when the retailer already has a chain does 
not. If the agreement was not material at the time the registrant entered into it, but becomes 
material at a later time, the registrant does not need to file Form 8-K. In either case, the registrant 
is required  to file the agreement as an exhibit to the periodic report in the period in which the 
agreement became material.
237
 Furthermore, the registrant must file the Form if an agreement is 
not “immaterial in amount or significance” within the meaning of Item 601(b)(10)(iii)(A) of 
Regulation S-K, unless it is not required to be disclosed under Item 601(b)(10)(iii)(C). This issue 
is considered from the perspective of a reasonable investor and within established standards of 
materiality.
238
 
Item 1.02 requires disclosure of a termination of an agreement prior to the established 
expiration, but not an agreement that expires under its terms. Once notice of termination is 
received, the Form is required, even if the registrant intends to negotiate and in good faith 
believes that the agreement has not been terminated.
239
 Importantly, the triggering event is the 
notice, not the termination of the agreement.
240
 Under Items 1.03 and 1.04, the registrant may 
include the company’s plan for Chapter 11 reorganization or Chapter 7 liquidation, and the 
court’s confirmation of the plan.241 
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Under Section 2, a company must report in Form 8-K:  (1) the completion of acquisition 
or disposition of assets; (2) results of operations and financial condition; (3) creation of a direct 
financial obligation or an obligation under an off-balance sheet arrangement of a registrant; (4) 
triggering events that accelerate or increase a direct financial obligation or an obligation under an 
off-balance sheet arrangement; (5) costs associated with exit or disposal activities; or (6) material 
impairments.
242
 
Item 2.01 requires a company to disclose any time a significant amount of assets are 
acquired or disposed, such as when a company buys or merges with another company, or sells a 
business unit. If a merger results in a “shell company”243 becoming a company in its own right, 
the registrant would provide investors with information about this company under this item.  
Under Item 2.02, the company usually summarizes the full financial statement, which often 
appears later in the company’s quarterly report or annual report. The company often announces 
these results in a press release and a Form 8-K simultaneously. Item 2.03 requires the basic terms 
of material financial obligations, including long-term debt, capital or operating lease, as well as 
short-term debt beyond ordinary course of business, to be disclosed. Any material financial 
obligations arising out of off-balance sheet arrangements, whether direct or contingent, must also 
be disclosed.
244
 The materiality of the financial obligation is “a facts and circumstances 
determination.”245 
Item 2.04 requires the disclosure of any event that triggers the acceleration or increase of 
a financial obligation as long as the event is material, such as defaults on loans. In the case of a 
loan default where the company must pay the entire amount owed, the company must disclose 
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the amount to be repaid, the terms of such repayment and other financial obligations that may 
have to be repaid on different terms as result of the initial default. Item 2.05 requires disclosure 
of restructuring plans where the company would incur material charges, such as the decision to 
close some of its stores, or lay off workers. Under this provision, the company must also disclose 
the costs estimates when it is able to determine them.
246
  
Lastly, under Item 2.06, a company must disclose write-downs, otherwise known as 
impairments. These occur when a company significantly lowers its estimates of the value of 
some assets.
247
 If the impairment is determined routinely as the company prepares its financial 
statements for its periodic report, then the company may make the disclosure in the periodic 
report, and not Form 8-K.
248
  
Under Section 3, a company must file Form 8-K when there is: (1) a notice of delisting or 
failure to satisfy a continued listing rule or standard or transfer of listing, (2) unregistered sales 
of equity securities, or (3) material modification to rights of security holders.   Under Item 3.01, 
a company must disclose if the stock exchange notifies it that it can no longer be listed. If the 
company has a grace period to return to compliance, it must disclose any steps it will take to 
avoid delisting. Item 3.02 mandates public companies to disclose private sales of securities 
above 1 percent of its outstanding shares of that class (or five percent for smaller reporting 
companies). Public offerings registered with the SEC, however, do not need to be disclosed. 
Under Item 3.03, companies are required to disclose material changes to instruments that define 
the rights of shareholders or material restrictions on the rights of security holders resulting from 
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the issuance or modification of another class of securities, such as loan term restricting dividend 
payments, adoption of an antitakeover device, or issuance of preferred stock.
249
  
Under Section 4, matters related to accountants and financial statements, such as (1) 
changes in the registrant’s certifying accountant or (2) non-reliance on previously issued 
financial statements or a related audit report or completed interim review, must also be filed.  
Public companies must disclose if they dismiss their independent auditor, if she resigns or 
declines to stand for re-appointment, as well as if the company hires a new auditor. As the SEC 
notes in its Investor Bulletin,
250
 a change in auditors may be a red flag for investors. Therefore, 
companies must disclose three major events if they occurred in the previous two fiscal years. 
First, it must disclose whether the departing auditor gave an adverse or qualified opinion on the 
company’s statements. Second, it must disclose disagreements it had with the departing auditor 
over accounting principles or practices, financial statements, or the scope or procedure of the 
audit.  Finally, companies are required to disclose whether the former auditor advised the 
company that:  (a) “the necessary internal controls to prepare reliable financial statements do not 
exist,” (b) “the auditor can no longer rely on management’s representations or is unwilling to be 
associated with the financial statements prepared by management,” (c) “the auditor believed it 
should further investigate a matter or significantly expand the scope of its audit, and the author 
did not do so,” or (d) “the auditor has found new information that materially impacts the fairness 
or reliability of current or prior financial statements, and the issue has not been resolved to the 
auditor’s satisfaction.”251 
Item 4.02 requires a disclosure of any error in the previously issued financial statements 
to establish that these should not be relied upon. Additionally, a company must disclose if the 
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auditor believes that the previously issued audit reports or interim reviews of these statements 
should not be relied upon. The company must demonstrate whether its audit committee, full 
board or authorized executive officer has discussed the issue with the auditor.
252
  
Section 5 discusses corporate governance and management. A company must file Form 
8-K when:  (1) there are changes in control of registrant; (2) there is departure of directors or 
certain officers; election of directors; appointment of certain officers; compensatory 
arrangements of certain officers; (3) there are amendments to articles of incorporation or bylaws 
or change in fiscal year; (4) temporary suspension of trading under registrant’s employee benefit 
plans; (5) amendments to registrant’s Code of Ethics, or waiver of a provision of the Code of 
Ethics; (6) change in shell company status; (7) submission of matters to a vote of security 
holders; and lastly, (8) shareholder director nominations.  
Under Item 5.01, the company must disclose an event where there is a change of control 
of the company, including identifying the persons acquiring the control and the percentage of 
voting securities they now possess, any arrangements between the previous and new control 
groups relating to election of directors or other important issues.
253
 In the event that a board 
member resigns or will not stand for re-election due to disagreement with the company in 
regards to its operations, policies, or practices, or a director is removed for cause from the board, 
the company has an obligation to disclose the circumstances of the disagreement under the Item 
5.02.
254
 If there is a letter from the director to this effect, the letter must be filed as an exhibit. In 
the event that a high-level executive officer retires, resigns, or is terminated, or alternatively, a 
new officer is appointed, the company must disclose this fact along with any related 
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compensation arrangements. Any changes to the compensation of the current high-level officers 
must also be disclosed.
255
  
Unless the company already disclosed the proposed amendments or fiscal year change in 
a proxy or information statement, the company must disclose any amendments to its articles of 
incorporation or bylaws, or changes to its fiscal year under Item 5.03. It should be noted that 
companies that issue only debt securities are usually exempted from this item.
 256
   
Under Item 5.05, companies are required to report any changes to their code of ethics or 
waivers that apply to the CEO, CFO, CAO or controller, or others performing similar duties. 
Companies may elect to disclose this information on their website instead of filing an 8-K.
257
 
Under Item 5.07, companies are required to file the results of the shareholder votes in director 
elections and on all other issues put to a vote within four business days of the end of an annual or 
special meeting. If such results are unavailable at the time, it is required to file preliminary 
results and an amended 8-K with final vote results within four business days of those results 
being available.
258
   
Under Section 6, a public company must disclose any:  (1) asset-backed securities (ABS) 
informational and computational material, (2) change of servicer or trustee, (3) change in credit 
enhancement or other external support, (4) failure to make a required distribution, or (5) 
Securities Act Updating Disclosure.
259
 
Section 7 discusses Regulation FD Disclosure. The purpose of this regulation is to 
“prevent companies from selectively disclosing material, nonpublic information.” Generally, 
                                                 
255
 Id.  
256
 Id. 
257
 Id.  
258
 Id. 
259
 The Securities Act Updating Disclosure requires that, with respect to offerings of asset-backed securities, “any 
material pool characteristic of the actual asset pool at the time of issuance of the asset-backed securities [that] differs 
by 5% or more . . . from the description of the asset pool in the prospectus” requires a disclosure regarding the 
characteristics of the actual asset pool. 
48 
companies are required to disclose material information to the public at the same time as it is 
provided to others, including securities market professionals. Companies may submit an 8-K 
under this Item or Item 8.01 to comply with the Regulation FD’s public disclosure requirement. 
Disclosures include announcements of dividends, quarterly sales of figures, etc.
260
 
Section 8 is a catch-all section where the registrant can report events that are not 
specifically called for by the Form, but the registrant nevertheless considers important to security 
holders.   Finally, Section 9 discusses financial statements and exhibits that a company may be 
required to furnish to supplement other parts of the form.  
A report must be filed or furnished within four business days
261
 of the occurrence of the 
event for items in Sections 1-6, and 9. If the form is being furnished only to satisfy its obligation 
under Regulation FD, the due date may be earlier.
262
  If a triggering event occurs within four 
business days before the registrant’s filing of a periodic report, it may be disclosed in that 
periodic report instead of filing of Form 8-K, unless it is required under Item 4.01 or Item 
4.02.
263
 
  
IV. Exploitation of Vagueness in Standards:  Profitability of Insiders’ Transactions    
 
      Given the vagueness of the insider trading laws, insiders have been able to exploit their 
material, nonpublic information by buying and selling the shares of their firms prior to the public 
dissemination of this information through 8-K filings, without facing legal consequences.   To 
test our hypothesis, we obtained stock price information from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP).  The insider trading data come from the union of the Thomson Reuters Insider 
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Filing Data Feed (1996 to 2013) and backward extensions using archived annual purchases from 
the National Archives (1975 to 1995).  We henceforth refer to this database as the “Back-
Extended Thomson Reuters” Database or simply the combined insider trading database.  Our 
sample includes U.S. common stocks (CRSP share codes of 10 or 11) that are covered by all 
three databases.  The time period is from January 1975 through December 2013.  We restrict 
attention to this interval due to the availability of insider trading data, which first became 
available in January of 1975.  We include observations beginning only from the time when the 
firms first appear in the combined insider trading database.  Following Shumway (1997), we 
adjust stock returns for delistings using the CRSP delisting file.  Our final dataset has over 
20,000 unique CUSIPs and over 3,500,000 observations.   
The combined Insider Filing Database includes all trades reported to the SEC-Ownership 
Reporting System. The data contains all open market purchases and sales by officers, directors, 
and beneficial owners (direct or indirect owners of more than 10% of any equity class of 
securities) of publicly traded firms.
264
 Shares acquired through exercise of options, stock awards, 
and trades with corporations are excluded. The final sample is limited to firms for which stock 
return data are available in CRSP.  Finally, in order to deal with potential misreports and 
incorrect outliers, three filters are used.  On the insider transaction date, (1) the insider 
transaction price must be less than twice the closing price of the stock, (2) the number of shares 
of the insider transactions will be less than the daily volume of trade of the stock, and (3) the 
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number of shares of the insider transaction will be less than the outstanding number of shares for 
the stock.
265
  
We measure the profitability of insider trades starting from the insider trade date. We 
measure abnormal stock return behavior using the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal daily 
stock returns (CAR) starting from the trade date (date 0) for a period of T days: 


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where Hi,t takes the value 1 for insider purchases and -1 for insider sales.  Thus, we define an 
insider purchase to be abnormally profitable if the stock price outperforms the general stock 
market after the purchase.  Similarly, we define an insider sale to be abnormally profitable if the 
stock price underperforms the general stock market after the sale.  The variable tir ,  is the cum-
dividend return to stock i for day t, and tmr ,  is the cum-dividend return to the CRSP equally-
weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ 
stocks for day t. We examine the profitability of insider trades for T=5, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 
days following insiders’ transactions. 
 To focus on insider transactions that are likely to be based on material, nonpublic 
information, we first require that the abnormal profitability (CAR) of insiders’ transactions 
exceed 5% by day 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50.  The results using insider trading data for the last 40 
years are shown in table 1.   
Our evidence shows that a significant portion of insider transactions exhibit immediate 
profitability.   During the decade of 1975-1984, over 60,000 transactions showed almost 
immediate abnormal profitability by beating the general stock market more than 5% during the 
first five days after the trade date.  Given the quick stock price reaction and immediate 
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profitability, these translations are likely to be based on material, nonpublic insider information. 
By day 50, the proportion of highly profitable transactions rises to about 40% of all trades by 
insiders.   
Over the next three decades, the number of transactions with immediate abnormal 
profitability steadily rose.  In the most recent decade (2005 to 2014), over 200,000 large-volume 
transactions show immediate profitability by day five.  The number of transactions that showed 
significant abnormal profitability by day 50 exceeded 500,000 during the decade 2005-2014, 
again constituting about 35% of all trades by insiders. 
As a second test of materiality, we now require that profitability of insider trades exceed 
10% within 5 days after trade.  These results are shown in table 2.  The overall sample period 
shows that there were more than 190,000 such transactions.  By day 50, the number of highly-
profitable transactions approaches one million.  These highly profitable transactions constitute 
about 27% of all insider trades. 
The average abnormal profitability of these selected insider transactions is shown in table 
3.  Within five days after insiders’ trade, insiders’ average abnormal profit reaches about 17% for 
the entire sample period, and rising further to about 20% by day 50.  The average abnormal 
profits for this highly profitable sample appear to be stable over the past four decades. 
To compute statistical significance of our findings, we compared the statistical 
distribution of actual insiders’ abnormal profits with the hypothetical distribution if insiders’ 
transaction had insiders not traded on material, nonpublic information.  To generate the 
hypothetical distribution, we took the actual insider transactions and then randomized the date of 
trade as well as the purchase/sale indicator using a random number generator.  About 53% of 
actual insider transactions show abnormal profitability while exactly 50% of the randomly 
generated hypothetical trades show abnormal profitability.  This difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and translates to over one hundred thousand transactions for our 
sample.   
52 
We also repeated this exercise for large transactions involving 10,000 or more shares.  In 
this case, the difference grew to 4% (54% versus 50%), which is again statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  Finally, we repeated this exercise for large transactions involving 10,000 or more 
shares by top executives. In this case, the difference grew to 4% to 6% for various holding 
periods (54% to 56% for actual trades versus 50% for hypothetical trades), which is again 
statistically significant at the 1% level.    
The fact that tens of thousands, to hundreds of thousands of additional trades exhibit high 
abnormal profitability demonstrates that Congress’ approach to leaving the definition of illegal 
insider information purposefully vague is not working.    To the contrary, our evidence indicates 
that insiders are taking advantage of this vagueness of the law to exploit their material, nonpublic 
information.  We suggest that Congress take up this opportunity to define the boundaries of what 
constitutes material, nonpublic and therefore illegal insider trading information.   
 
 
Conclusion 
  
The 40 year time period from 1975 to 2014 that we investigated has seen a number of 
changes in insider trading laws.  While Congress kept increasing civil and criminal penalties for 
criminal insider trading, it kept the definition of what is material, nonpublic information 
purposefully vague.  The 1984 ITSA established a civil penalty up to three times the profit or 
loss avoided for both insiders as well as tippers.
266
  The 1988 ITSFA provided for private right of 
action for contemporaneous trading, a bounty program to collect up to 10% of the insiders’ 
illegal profits, while also increasing the maximum penalties for violations of insider trading laws 
to $1 million in fines and 10 years in prison.
267
  Finally, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act further 
increased the penalties for purposeful violations of the insider trading laws to $5 million in fines 
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and prison sentence up to 20 years.
268
  Clearly, none of these increases in penalties have been 
successful in even slowing down profitable insider trading. 
 
The recent Second Circuit decision in Newman represents a step backward in clarifying 
what is material, nonpublic information and should be reversed.  According to Newman, 
establishing tippee liability under Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act
269
 and Rule 10b-5 
of the SEC
270
 requires tippee knowledge of tipper personal benefit. The Second Circuit interprets 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks stringently,271 reversing the trend in the federal judiciary 
over the past 30 years of allowing the Dirks personal benefit requirement to be satisfied by proof 
that (1) the tippee knew the insider-tipper breached a fiduciary-like duty
272
 in disclosing 
confidential information and (2) that the insider expected to obtain a personal benefit in 
exchange for disclosure.
273
 Moreover, apart from expounding this strict interpretation of the 
elements needed to establish tippee liability, the Newman court also set surprisingly high 
evidentiary standards for proving these elements.  
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 The combination of these legal and evidentiary adjustments to the Dirks test could have 
serious implications for the government’s efforts to deter insider trading. The reason for this is 
quite simple. When potential tippees know they can trade on confidential information without 
recourse—just so long as they are careful to receive that information from “a friend of a friend of 
[a friend]”274—this easily circumvented liability rule should be expected to give rise to informal 
information sharing networks.
275
 By habitually sharing inside information with friends and 
associates, insiders could easily engage in indirect, mutual-back-scratching relationships, 
disclosing valuable information to the network in the hope that similarly situated individuals 
“three and four levels removed from the inside tipper”276 will reciprocate. Such arrangements 
could lead to significant increases in insider trading activity, and thus exacerbate the practice’s 
primary consequences: the unfair transfer of wealth from ordinary investors to insider traders and 
the diminution of the public’s confidence and participation in securities markets277 (which, in 
turn, would likely promote less efficient allocations of investor capital and reduced liquidity in 
the financial sector).
278
  Considering these negative consequences, it is imperative that the legal 
community find ways to circumvent the constraints Newman imposes on prosecutors.  
This article puts forth a solution, identifying evidence that could demonstrate a tippee’s 
knowledge of tipper benefit without requiring actual knowledge of the confidential information’s 
source. By using the 8-K filing as a proxy for tippee knowledge of tipper breach of duty and 
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personal benefit, this approach puts tippees on notice that the specific information has been 
disclosed contrary to law and in violation of fiduciary duties. Because there should be no 
legitimate business purpose for disclosing such information without filing an 8-K, the failure to 
file should also be strong enough circumstantial evidence to support an inference that the tipper 
has shared confidential information in order to secure a personal benefit. This is because no 
rational insider would assume the liability risk associated with such a disclosure if she did not 
expect to benefit from it. This evidentiary presumption is not only consistent with Newman and 
other insider trading case law, it also promises to significantly expand the ability of prosecutors 
to bring cases against putative insider traders. Moreover, this approach exemplifies how similar 
evidentiary presumptions might be employed to bridge the ‘knowledge gap’ that now makes it so 
difficult—and under Newman practically impossible—to establish downstream tippee liability.  
 
  
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Decade
Total number 
of open 
market 
trades
After 5 
Days
After 10 
Days
After 20 
Days
After 30 
Days
After 40 
Days
After 50 
Days
1975-1984 380,315          61,759        93,072          123,375        139,147        149,452        156,731        
16.2% 24.5% 32.4% 36.6% 39.3% 41.2%
1985-1994 428,432          70,652        102,463       137,748        156,942        170,001        177,843        
16.5% 23.9% 32.2% 36.6% 39.7% 41.5%
1995-2004 1,134,154      215,859      300,885       387,741        435,868        462,386        483,736        
19.0% 26.5% 34.2% 38.4% 40.8% 42.7%
2005-2014 1,578,253      204,042      309,572       418,712        477,534        528,742        563,082        
12.9% 19.6% 26.5% 30.3% 33.5% 35.7%
1975-2014 3,521,154      552,312      805,992       1,067,576    1,209,491    1,310,581    1,381,392    
15.7% 22.9% 30.3% 34.3% 37.2% 39.2%
Table 1: The number and percentage of highly profitable insider transactions exceeding 
5% in abnormal profits
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Decade
Total number 
of open 
market 
trades
After 5 
Days
After 10 
Days
After 20 
Days
After 30 
Days
After 40 
Days
After 50 
Days
1975-1984 380,315          19,399        38,054          65,928          84,540          97,537          108,743        
5.1% 10.0% 17.3% 22.2% 25.6% 28.6%
1985-1994 428,432          23,867        43,314          74,524          96,700          113,231        125,716        
5.6% 10.1% 17.4% 22.6% 26.4% 29.3%
1995-2004 1,134,154      86,822        146,557       228,735        289,818        328,642        357,715        
7.7% 12.9% 20.2% 25.6% 29.0% 31.5%
2005-2014 1,578,253      61,022        117,456       204,991        268,452        323,513        368,269        
3.9% 7.4% 13.0% 17.0% 20.5% 23.3%
1975-2014 3,521,154      191,110      345,381       574,178        739,510        862,923        960,443        
5.4% 9.8% 16.3% 21.0% 24.5% 27.3%
Table 2: The number and percentage of highly profitable insider transactions exceeding 
10% in abnormal profits.  
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Decade
Total number 
of open 
market 
trades
After 5 
Days
After 10 
Days
After 20 
Days
After 30 
Days
After 40 
Days
After 50 
Days
1975-1984 19,399            16.6% 16.3% 15.9% 16.2% 16.4% 16.9%
      
1985-1994 23,867            16.6% 15.6% 16.1% 16.7% 17.6% 18.1%
      
1995-2004 86,822            18.4% 18.1% 19.4% 20.5% 21.5% 22.6%
      
2005-2014 61,022            17.1% 17.4% 17.1% 17.8% 17.5% 17.6%
      
1975-2014 191,110          17.6% 17.4% 17.9% 18.8% 19.2% 19.9%
      
Table 3: Average Abnormal Profitability of Insider Trades Conditional on  Exceeding 10% 
in 5 Days.  
